When debugging or tracking potential issues with snaps running within a confined environment, the following approaches, techniques and insights can help resolve issues quickly:
In addition to the above, GDB can also be used from within a snap’s environment to help isolate and identify potential issues. See Using gdb and gsbserver for more details.
For details on how AppArmor, Seccomp and device permission security policies are implemented, see Security policy and sandboxing.
To help isolate runtime errors when building and testing a snap, a snap can be installed using developer mode.
To install a snap in developer mode, use the
$ sudo snap install --devmode mysnap
When a snap is installed with developer mode, violations against a snap’s security policy are permitted to proceed but logged via journald.
The easiest way to check for snap policy violations is to search the logs for audit:
$ sudo journalctl --since=yesterday | grep audit
The above command uses
--since=yesterday to limit the typically verbose logging output from journalctl.
A handy debugging technique is to tail/follow journalctl output while exercising the snap:
$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.printk_ratelimit=0 ; journalctl --follow | grep audit
As shown above, kernel log rate limiting can be disabled manually with
sudo sysctl -w kernel.printk_ratelimit=0)
If you believe there is a bug in a security policy or want to request and/or contribute a new interface, please file a bug, adding the
snapd-interface tag, and feel free to discuss policy issues on the forum.
An AppArmor violation will look something like the following:
audit: type=1400 audit(1431384420.408:319): apparmor="DENIED" operation="mkdir" profile="snap.foo.bar" name="/var/lib/foo" pid=637 comm="bar" requested_mask="c" denied_mask="c" fsuid=0 ouid=0
If there are no AppArmor denials, AppArmor shouldn’t be blocking the snap.
To better understand AppArmor policy for a strictly installed snap, modify the AppArmor policy in place on the target system. Changes aren’t persistent, but this can help when considering a snapd patch or bug report.
snap run --shell <name>.<command>), monitoring via journalctl for denials
/var/lib/snapd/apparmor/profiles/snap.<name>.<command>as needed (eg, adding rules before the final
sudo apparmor_parser -r /var/lib/snapd/apparmor/profiles/snap.<name>.<command>to compile and load the policy into the kernel
sudo service snap.<name>.<command> stop/start/etcas needed for daemons
A seccomp violation will look something like:
audit: type=1326 audit(1430766107.122:16): auid=1000 uid=1000 gid=1000 ses=15 pid=1491 comm="env" exe="/bin/bash" sig=31 arch=40000028 syscall=983045 compat=0 ip=0xb6fb0bd6 code=0x0
syscall=983045 can be resolved by running the
scmp_sys_resolver command on a system of the same architecture as the one with the seccomp violation:
$ scmp_sys_resolver 983045 set_tls
If there are no seccomp violations, seccomp isn’t blocking the snap.
If you notice
compat=1 in the seccomp denial, then specify the correct compatibility architecture to
-a <arch>. Eg, if on an amd64 system, use
scmp_sys_resolver -a x86 191 (use
-a arm on arm64 systems).
The seccomp filter profile in expected to be located in /var/lib/snapd/seccomp/bpf/*.src (formerly /var/lib/snapd/seccomp/profiles).
The seccomp profile source (the .src file in the profile directory) needs to be recompiled into the profile binary (.bin in the profile directory) as follows:
$ sudo /usr/lib/snapd/snap-seccomp compile /var/lib/snapd/seccomp/bpf/snap.$SNAP_NAME.src /var/lib/snapd/seccomp/bpf/snap.$SNAP_NAME.bin
snap-confine command will load the bpf in the
.bin file for the command when you (re)launch the command or
snap run --shell. The seccomp policy language is considerably simpler and is essentially a list of allowed syscalls.
When done, copy any changes you make to
/var/lib/snapd/seccomp/bpf/snap.<name>.<command>.src to your interface code.
Tools such as snap-confine, snap-seccomp and snap-exec are internal to snapd and are initially installed with a distribution’s snapd package.
On certain distributions, these tools can become superseded by versions embedded in subsequently installed core and snapd snaps. When developing a seccomp profile, it is important that the correct snap-seccomp binary is used. This can be determined by inspecting which binary is running as snapd.
With re-execution from the subsequently installed core and snapd snaps, these tools get called using their full path from the same location as the currently running binary. This is visible from
# with reexecution $ sudo ls -l /proc/$(pidof snapd)/exe lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jun 5 10:10 /proc/1994/exe -> /snap/snapd/7777/usr/lib/snapd/snapd
Thus tools such as snap-seccomp will be called using its full path,
Without re-execution, the snapd process is using a binary located in the host filesystem:
# no reexecution $ sudo ls -l /proc/$(pidof snapd)/exe lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 06-05 12:49 /proc/808335/exe -> /usr/lib/snapd/snapd
Correspondingly, snap-seccomp will be called using its full path
snappy-debug snap can be used to help with policy violations:
The following command will watch /var/log/syslog (output is initially empty until there’s a policy violation):
$ sudo snappy-debug INFO: Following '/var/log/syslog'. If have dropped messages, use: INFO: $ sudo journalctl --output=short --follow --all | sudo snappy-debug ^C $
It’s recommended that snappy-debug is run alongside journalctl:
$ sudo journalctl --output=short --follow --all | sudo snappy-debug
snappy-debug --help for further details.
While tradition file permissions are respected and enforced, any violations are not currently logged. Similarly, device cgroups may also block access without logging denials.
To check whether device cgroups are affecting a snap’s device access:
udevadm info /dev/$DEVICEto see if the snap shows up in TAGS, or see if the
/sys/fs/cgroup/snap.$SNAPNAME.$COMMANDdirectory exists and if the device is listed in
/dev/kmsgwould have ‘
c 1:11 rwm’ since
/dev/kmsgis a character device with MAJOR:MINOR as 1:11 (see
ls -l /dev/kmsg))
For device cgroups, create or modify
/etc/udev/rules.d/70-snap.$SNAPNAME.rules as necessary (eg,
KERNEL=="kmsg" TAGS+="snap_$YOURSNAPNAME_$YOURCOMMAND" would tag
/dev/kmsg for your snap), then run
sudo udevadm trigger --action=change. To undo the access, remove the file and run the
udevadm command again. When done, update the interfaces code based on your changes.
If you believe there is a bug in the security policy or want to request and/or contribute a new interface, please file a bug, adding the
aa-logproftools because they are not yet snappy-aware)
Last updated 5 days ago. Help improve this document in the forum.